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Introduction 
 
Like a lot of my work, this article was stimulated by events around me in the 
north east of England. Specifically, the trigger was the proposal and 
subsequent campaign for an elected Regional Assembly as part of an 
emerging devolved system of government in the English Regions and its 
decisive rejection by a substantial majority of those who voted in a 
referendum in November 2004. During the 1980s voices began to be raised in 
the north east for a degree of constitutional reform and regional devolution as 
a more effective way of tackling the region’s continuing poor economic 
performance (for example, see Byrne, 1990). In part, this reflected the failures 
of central government regional policies for the region to bring about an up-turn 
in the region’s economic fortunes – indeed, these regional policies were 
swamped in their effects by waves of deindustrialisation as nationalisation 
became a mechanism for a profound regional deindustrialisation (Hudson, 
1989). These tendencies were reinforced sharply as the Thatcherite 
Government sought actively to cut the scope of state involvement in economy 
and society – with heavy impacts on regions such as the north east (for 
example, see Beynon et al, 1991; 1994). From 1997 Blair’s ‘New Labour’ 
government embraced much of the Thatcherite neo-liberal economic agenda, 
and at the same time added a new strand in terms of seeking further to 
devolve political power from central government to English regions and the 
Celtic nations (for discussion of these developments, see Morgan, 200i; 
Tomaney, 2000).  
 
While the devolution movements in Scotland and Wales were informed by 
complex mixtures of cultural, economic and political motives, much of the 
impetus for this increased emphasis on devolution in England was more 
straightforwardly economistic: that is, a belief that this would help reduce 
differences in regional economic performance and productivity and provide an 
alternative to the failures of past central government regional policies for 
peripheral regions. Consequently, especially among policymakers, the debate 
has focused in particular on how the powers and functions of elected regional 
assemblies could be used to promote regional economic development and 
reduce regional inequalities (Russell Barter, 2002). Nowhere was this more 
apparent than in north east England (Humphrey and Shaw, 2004). The 
negative effects of central government policies in and on north east England 
created space for those who - drawing on a history of cross-class regionalist 
solutions that go back to the 1930s (Hudson, 2005a) - wished to argue for a 
 1
greater degree of devolution of political power to the region.  More specifically, 
they asserted that devolving the power of decision and commensurate 
resources to the region would create conditions for – if not quite guarantee - 
regional economic revival. In seeking to understand events unfolding around 
me in north east England - the reasons why this campaign gathered pace and 
why the offer of an elected Regional Assembly was rejected – I began to 
reflect upon the more general tendency to devolved government over much of 
the capitalist world and to draw upon several developments in human 
geography and related social sciences in the 1980s and 1990s that were both 
stimulated by and also encouraged this tendency.  
 
 
Changes in the character of contemporary capitalism: the rise of neo-
liberal globalisation, claims about the limits to national state activity and 
the need for new governmentalities 
 
By the latter half of the 1970s, the limits to Keynesian welfare statism had 
become evident, with fears of fiscal crisis (O’Connor, 1973) leading to sharp 
cut-backs in the scope of state expenditure leading to widening intra-national 
regional inequalities over much of the capitalist world (for example, see 
Dunford, 1994). The boundaries of state involvement in economy and society, 
it was claimed, had to be drawn more narrowly to allow greater scope for 
market forces as resource allocating mechanisms as the only route to restore 
economic growth and prosperity. There were claims that previously powerful 
national states were being disabled as a result of resurgent processes of 
globalisation, a force beyond the control of national governments. The view 
that national government policies can only adapt to globalisation trends and 
seek to ride with the tide and reap such benefits as is possible from so doing 
gained widespread acceptance in dominant policy circles. This reflected an 
emergent new dominant – if not quite hegemonic - governmentality (on the 
Foucauldian concept of governmentality, see Dean, 1999) that re-imagined 
relations between economy, state and civil society and the re-scaling of 
political power within and beyond the state as the only possible response to 
autonomous processes of globalisation that somehow had a life of their own, 
beyond the reach of political and social intervention. As such, all that could be 
done was to adapt to them – there was, so the new consensus had it, no 
possibility of challenging them. Now this is clearly a one-sided and partial view 
of neo-liberal globalisation. Not least it conveniently ignored the extent to 
which neo-liberal globalisation was authored and scripted by some powerful 
national states – notably the USA and UK -, and associated international 
organisations such as the IMF and World Bank, buttressed by supportive 
academic commentators and apologists. Nonetheless it was a very influential 
one.  
 
This emergent neo-liberal governmentality also re-imagined relations between 
the national state and sub-national political entities. Political power was - 
allegedly – to be devolved to regions to enable them actively to compete for 
capital investment as the route to economic prosperity. As all regions could 
successfully compete, all could be “winners”, and as a result regional 
economic inequalities could be evened out.  For peripheral and  
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deindustrialised regions such as north east England the reality was rather 
different, not least because of the effects of previous phases of uneven 
development so that the inter-regional competitive playing field was far from 
level.  As a result, the outcome was participation in a race to the bottom 
based on seeking to undercut competitor regions on cost as concerns with 
regional plans were replaced with regional strategies, premised on the 
assumption that there was no choice but to adapt to the external forces of 
globalisation processes. 
 
Re-thinking the region: regions as subjects of policy 
 
The growing emphasis within this emergent neo-liberal governmentality upon 
the region as a pro-active subject rather than passive object in receipt  of 
central government financial aid, a political actor as well as a site of political 
activity, chimed nicely with the growing emphasis on re-thinking the concept 
of the region that was increasingly in evidence from the later part of the 
1980s. The key in this process of re-thinking was what we might term the 
relational turn (see Allen et al 1998; Amin, 2004). Regions are seen as 
constituted from spatialized social relations, stretched out over space and 
materialised in various form, and representational narratives about them. 
Regions can be seen as products of complex condensations of social 
relationships, of varying density and variety, which combine contingently in 
specific time/space couplings to produce what are, in the last analysis, unique 
regions.  
 
This relational approach provides a way of thinking that discloses a region 
which is by no means necessarily a whole, with the characteristics of 
coherence which that term implies; nor is it necessarily a bounded and closed 
entity.  However, it is also the case that there is a wealth of evidence of 
people seeking to construct regions as if they were closed, bounded and 
coherent, with shared and unified regional interests. A relational approach 
emphasises that regions are defined for specific purposes, socially 
constructed, both discursively and materially, in relation to specific criteria 
(Hudson, 2001, 255-85). This raises the critical questions of who acquires the 
power to represent a region in this way and speak on its behalf as it performs 
as a political subject in policy debates (Hudson, 2005b).   
 
 
Re-organising the state 
 
In recent years, the expansion of regional governance and government and 
growing devolution to regions has been reflected in and, to a degree, 
encouraged by a burgeoning academic literature (for example, Agnew, 2000; 
Keating, 1998). One of the more influential interpretations of this 
devolutionary tendency is that of Jessop (for example, 1997; 2003; see also 
Brenner et al, 2003), which sees regional devolution as part of the new multi-
scalar architecture of governance. This involves internationalisation of policy 
regimes, the de-nationalisation (‘hollowing out’) of the political system with 
devolution of power within the state to cities and regions and a selective shift 
of power and influence out of the state and into organisations in civil society 
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via a process of de-statisation. These shifts are linked to the emergence of 
new network concepts and networked forms of regional governance, policy 
formation and delivery (for example, Benz A and Fürst D, 2002; Sternberg et 
al, 2000), crossing the state/civil society boundary. These new forms of 
governing are typically referred to as partnerships, with temporary Task 
Forces as an important innovation in this mode of policy delivery (Pike, 2002). 
Often, however, such networked approaches to regional policy and 
developments ignore that point that such networks are constructed within the 
context of existing networks of social relations characterised by sharp power 
asymmetries (Hadjimichalis and Hudson, 2003). Furthermore, the growing 
emphasis on governance is recognition of the increasing importance - or 
perhaps more accurately is increasing recognition of the importance - of the 
institutions of civil society as well as those of the state in securing the conditions 
under which the economy is possible.  
 
In one respect, however, devolution to regions (and indeed other sub-national 
spatial scales) is well-established, as the central state has shifted the 
administration of its policies to sub-national scales for reasons of both 
administrative efficiency and legitimacy in many countries. What is claimed to 
be new and qualitatively different about more recent regional devolution is that 
it encompasses the power to decide, plus resources to implement decisions, 
at regional level.  Others, however, dispute this, and argue that what has been 
devolved to the regional level is responsibility without authority, power and 
resources. In effect, the national state shifts responsibility to the regional level 
– and if economic revival does not follow, it can lay the blame at the door of 
regional actors and organisations. Clearly which interpretation is correct is of 
some significance, theoretically and practically, not least in terms of the 
capacity to transform regional economies and radically alter regional 
economic development trajectories.  
 
 
Regional success stories: myths, illusions and raised expectations 
 
There are certainly frequent claims in the literature over the last decade or so 
that many of the regions that have experienced strong economic growth, 
economic resurgence and transformation in a globalising world are those 
endowed with well-developed networks of regional institutions (for example, 
Harding et al, 1999; Storper, 1995; 1997). Proponents of devolved regional 
government draw attention to a number of by now well-known, and rather 
stylised, “regional economic success stories” – such as the Third Italy, Silicon 
Valley, or Baden-Württemberg – claiming that these are successful regional 
economies because they have devolved forms of regional governance and 
appropriate “institutional thickness” (Amin and Thrift, 1994). Such regions are 
regularly cited as examples that demonstrate the close link between devolved 
government, regional institutions and regional economic success. In so far as 
this reflected a re-recognition of the social basis of the economy, it was to be 
welcomed. In so far as it suggested that this re-socialisation could and should 
take place at the regional scale, it was more problematic, not least because of 
the legacy of the map of uneven development as a result of previous phases 
of capitalist development. By suggesting that the experiences of the “success 
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stories” were generalisable and transferable, so that all regions could be 
“winners” and the map of development thereby could be made more even and 
equitable. This led to raised expectations in other parts of the world - for 
example, in post-Franco Spain, ‘La España de las Autonomĺas’ (Fernández 
Rodrĺguez, 1985), the United Kingdom and more generally the European 
Union, with the emergence of “The Europe of the Regions” - that regional 
devolution would lead to more even economic development.  
 
Such claims, however, rest on a “surprising” paucity of supportive empirical 
evidence as to the links between devolution, regional economic success and 
regional inequality (Rodrĺguez–Pose and Gill, 2004, 2117). Typically such 
evidence as there is of the link between devolved regional government and 
regional economic success is evidence of association rather than causation 
(cf. Boyer, 2005; Coriat and Dosi, 1998).  More generally, as Pike and 
Tomaney (2004, 2093) put it, the precise nature of the linkages between 
regional governance and social development – and even more so, the 
character and direction of any causal links between them – “remains subject 
to conjecture”. For Giordano and Roller (2004, 2165), reflecting on the 
evidence from a range of studies, the “common assumption … that greater 
regional autonomy has led to positive impacts upon economic well-being” is a 
“somewhat bold claim”. Not least, this is because of the persistence of 
regional inequalities and uneven development despite regional devolution. As 
they go on to point out (ibid, 2179, emphasis added) in relation to Spain, 
“creating regional government has done very little to narrow deeply 
entrenched and long-standing disparities between the relatively wealthier and 
poorer Spanish regions. Although it is fair to say that greater autonomy has 
helped to improve the economic fortunes of some of the poorer regions, at the 
same time it is the wealthier regions that have benefited relatively more from 
having greater autonomy”. In short, while some poorer regions have improved 
their economic fortunes, the major beneficiaries have been the already more 
prosperous regions – so that the map of inequalities has both widened and 
become more complicated.  
 
More generally, having reviewed the available evidence regarding the 
relations between regional disparities and political decentralisation processes 
in Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Spain and the USA, Rodrĺguez–Pose and Gill 
(2004, 2115) conclude that “claims of a supposed economic dividend in terms 
of territorial equity should be greeted with caution, if not with outright 
sketpicism”.  Indeed they go further and in a similar  manner to Giordano and 
Roller in the specific case of Spain suggest that the persistence of regional 
inequalities is because of – rather than despite – such devolution. 
Recognising that “the causal direction of [the] relationship remains 
unconfirmed” (an important caveat), “ in each of the countries examined the 
explanation of rising inequality across regions could be logically traced to the 
political and policy-making events that have surrounded evolving centre-state 
relations since 1980.   But in every case – with the possible exception of 
Brazil - there is sufficient evidence to suspect a relationship between 
devolutionary initiatives and rising inequalities”. While not the only cause, 
institutional decentralisation has a “large bearing” on the persistence of 
regional inequality (Rodrĺguez–Pose and Gill, 2004, 2100). At best, then – as 
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the ambiguity over the Brazilian case and the small number of Spanish 
regions that have benefited economically from devolution, as alluded to by 
Giordano and Roller suggests - if political devolution is to have positive effects 
on regional economic performance and the map of regional inequality, then 
these effects are contingent and understanding these contingencies takes on 
pressing theoretical and practical importance.   
 
Moreover, regional growth models in the iconic and exemplary successful 
regions are not only claimed to be grounded in regionally-specific institutions 
and devolved forms of governance but also to be socially inclusive and 
egalitarian developmental models. However, the available evidence as to the 
social relations of the economy in these regions often sits uneasily with such 
claims. In so far as there is evidence of regional economic success, it is often 
seemingly based upon exploitative and regressive social relations within the 
workplace in terms of low wages and poor working conditions (for example, 
see Hadjimichalis, 2005; Ferus-Comelo, 2005). This is in strong contrast to 
the stylised accounts that represent these as examples of socially inclusive 
and progressive growth models. Thus, more generally this reinforces the 
salience of the conclusion that “what devolved governance is for and in whose 
interest remain fundamental questions” (Pike and Tomaney, 2004, 2091). 
 
In summary, there may well be circumstances in which devolved regional 
government may (but does not automatically) bring a range of benefits other 
than regional economic revival – such as greater political accountability and 
transparency in decision making and political processes (for example, as in 
post-Franco Spain: see Fernández Rodrĺguez, 1985). These are to be 
welcomed. Critically, however, the frequently asserted link between political 
devolution and economic success, which came to form the main plank of the 
argument for an elected Regional Assembly in north east England, is often 
just that: asserted, without a firm evidential basis that convincingly 
demonstrates that the relationship is causal and that the direction of causation 
is from political devolution to economic success rather than vice versa. Now of 
course it could be argued that causation in social life is always more 
complicated, involving multi-variate relations and recursive feedback loops, 
complex processes and emergent effects and properties – but that is a 
different issue … 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The main conclusions relating to putative links between devolved regional 
government and/or governance and regional economic success can be 
summarised as follows.  First, there are many good reasons to support 
regional devolution, such as increased accountability and transparency in 
political decision-making. Even so, the extent to which this would involve 
devolving power to the region and, if power was devolved, what this would 
translate to in terms of progressive developmental policies and transparent 
and accountable decision making, remains unclear. The proliferation of 
appointed and unelected organisations such as QUANGOS and Task Forces 
emphasises that there is no necessary connection between devolution and 
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enhanced accountability and transparency (Pike, 2004). Secondly, and 
critically, regional devolution is unlikely to lead to regional economic success 
in the north east of England – and indeed in other peripheralised regions, 
especially if economic success continues to be defined via the parameters of 
the formal mainstream capitalist economy (such as profitability and share-
holder value). The law of value and processes of combined and uneven 
development are integral to the expansion of capital (for example, see 
Harvey, 1982) and as such cannot simply to abolished by regional devolution. 
At best political devolution may be a necessary condition for regional 
economic revival in some peripheralised regions but it is certainly not a 
sufficient one – and it cannot be the basis of a “win win” scenario in which all 
regions become economically successful and equally prosperous. 
Furthermore, there are numerous examples of regional economic growth in 
the absence of political devolution to the region. However, regional economic 
success does not necessarily equate with socially inclusive and equitable 
development within a region. Moreover, it may well be that regional devolution 
may exacerbate the problems of weak and peripheralised  regions precisely 
because it further reinforces the advantages of those core regions that are 
already economically more successful. The success of some regions in 
“winning” may be directly related to the failure of others in “losing”. As concern 
for inter-regional equality is (albeit only implicitly) compromised by policies 
that emphasise regional autonomy, and the role of government in promoting 
inter-regional equity gives way to an emphasis upon securing conditions to 
allow regions to compete in place-markets, devolution to regions “has 
unleashed forces that seem to be contributing to perpetuate and, in some 
cases, aggravate existing disparities” (Rodrĺguez–Pose and Gill, 2004, 2115).  
The clear implication is that if such peripheralised and marginalised regional 
economies are to be revived and regenerated, this will require a lot more than 
simply some limited devolution of political power within the structures of the 
state and systems of multi-level and multi-scalar governing. It remains an 
open question as to the extent to which this would be possible, precisely 
because they have been peripheralised as a consequence of the inner 
dynamic of capital accumulation and the combined and uneven character that 
the capitalist form of economic development necessarily and unavoidably 
assumes.  
 
Thirdly, on the other hand, a failure to appreciate that there is no necessary 
causal relationship between regional devolution and regional economic 
success may well seriously weaken the case for regional devolution, which on 
other grounds may be something to welcome. Therefore there are manifest 
political dangers in pinning the argument for regional devolution to the mast of 
‘regional economic success’. This is only likely to lead – once again - to 
unrealised expectations and disappointment, discrediting the concept of 
devolution per se and cutting the ground from beneath the other to be 
welcomed ways in which the concept of greater political devolution and 
regional accountability could enhance life in peripheral regions. Fourthly, there 
is a need for eternal vigilance to guard against the danger of allowing the 
pursuit of the Holy Grail of regional economic renewal and revival via regional 
devolution to become the ‘enabling myth’ (Dugger, 2000) through which the 
central state shifts the blame onto the victim for the continuing economic 
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problems of regions such as north east England. Finally, there is a need to 
recognise the limits to devolution of power within the formal political system in 
order to open up space in which to explore more radical alternatives.  
 
This re-thinking would need to encompass at least five dimensions. First, re-
thinking the economy, and recognising that this embraces much more than 
the formal mainstream market economy. Secondly, re-thinking development 
so as, for example, to give much more weight to questions of distribution and 
issues such as health and well-being. Thirdly, re-thinking appropriate forms of 
politics, to explore more participatory forms of democratic practice, more open 
and transparent fora for political decision making beyond as well as within the 
formal structures of party politics. Fourthly, recognising the limits to the 
regional, and insisting that the national state continues to acknowledge its 
responsibilities for the social and economic well-being of its citizens, wherever 
they live. For example, as Rodrĺguez–Pose and Gill (2004, 2115) conclude, 
“(regional) devolution per se will …not deliver greater territorial equity. This 
objective would require the establishment of substantial interterritorial fiscal 
equalisation systems at the national or supranational level if the persistence 
and permanence of economic disparities are not to become one of the 
hallmarks of future geographies”. More generally, “the national state remains 
pivotal and often decisive in shaping the character and extent of subnational 
governance and economic and social development (Pike and Tomaney, 2004, 
2093). Acknowledging the force of this point, however, it is equally important 
to stress that the state apparatus cannot be simply and non-problematically 
‘captured’ to address the needs of the mass of the population of north east 
England or any other peripheralised region. The key issue then becomes the 
architecture of the system of governing and the power relations between the 
regional and national within, but also beyond, the structures of the state. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly of all, re-thinking the region to escape 
the limitations of the myth of a unified (and unifying) regional interest and 
explicitly acknowledge the existence of different – and at times openly 
competitive, grounded in different class structural positions and other sources 
of social power – interests held by individuals and social groups living in the 
same space. Within such an agonistic politics, which interests prevailed and 
which were prioritised in state policy agendas would be seen as the outcome 
of overtly political struggle based on a recognition of legitimate (or at least 
legally sanctioned) difference – often grounded in structurally asymmetrical 
power relations - rather than a presumption of homogeneity of interest on the 
basis of a shared regional identity. Recognition of this emphasises that 
progress towards new moral geographies would need to grapple with more 
complex spatialities than simply those of inter-regional relations. 
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